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high severityMicrosoft Defender XDR

Detect Office apps spawning shells (KQL)

When Word, Excel, Outlook or another Office app launches cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe or a living-off-the-land binary, it usually means a malicious macro, a weaponised document or a phishing attachment has executed. This DeviceProcessEvents query matches processes whose initiating process is an Office application and whose image is a shell, scripting host or common LOLBin.

It is one of the most productive endpoint detections for user-driven initial access and execution.

The query

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (
    "winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "outlook.exe",
    "mspub.exe", "onenote.exe", "msaccess.exe", "visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ (
    "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
    "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName,
          ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc

Line-by-line explanation

  • | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", ...)

    Requires the parent to be an Office application — the pivot that makes this suspicious rather than ordinary scripting.

  • | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "mshta.exe", ...)

    Keeps only child processes that are shells, scripting hosts or LOLBins — the tools a malicious document reaches for.

  • project ... ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

    Surfaces both command lines so an analyst can see what the document ran and which file opened it.

Required tables and columns

  • InitiatingProcessFileNameThe parent image; an Office application here.
  • FileNameThe spawned child process image (shell, scripting host or LOLBin).
  • ProcessCommandLineWhat the child process was told to do — the payload.
  • InitiatingProcessCommandLineThe Office command line, often showing the opened document path.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Tuning and false positives

  • Exclude known-good add-ins and automation that legitimately shell out (some enterprise templates do), scoped by command-line pattern.
  • Promote to critical when the child command line contains download or encoded-execution indicators.

Limitations

  • Malware that injects into a trusted process or uses COM to run code without a direct child process will not appear as an Office child.
  • Legitimate but unusual business macros can match; baseline per environment.

References

Last reviewed 2026-11-18.